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CLASS AND CLASS-CONSCIOUSNESS IN WESTERN
EUROPEAN CITIES, 1400-1650
Studies which focus on class and class-consciousness
in modern capitalist society are few and inadequate, but
they are virtually nonexistent in regard to precapitalist
social formations. In this paper I examine the kinds of
relationships found in Western European cities at the end
of the Middle Ages and the opening of the modern period,
in order to a n s w e r — o r at least touch on--the following
questions: How can classes be defined in the 15th, 16th,
and 17th centuries? Was their nature changing across this
period and if so, why and in what ways? What sorts of
consciousness did social groups exhibit and how did they
act? Before looking at the specific period, let me indicate the definitions and assumptions underlying my analysis .
A class is a group of people with a common relationship to the means of production (as expressed through
property relationships), to the appropriation of the surplus value created in production, and to other social
groups with different relation to the economic structure.
In this sense, all societies have been class societies,
and all relations are class relations. Historically,
however, the development of productive forces has determined the general division of labor required to perform the
material and other tasks deemed necessary at the time.
But the specific organization of work and appropriation
of surplus within a given mode of production depend on human struggles and creativitity. The interaction of such
human efforts and the productive forces produces the particular class system, a conflict-ridden equilibrium, embodied in various sets of relationships: economic, social
and political (including juridical), each with its own
ideology.
Economic relationships are often felt most concretely, not only in work experiences but also in access to
consumption, and are internally stratified by these production and distribution disparities. Social relationships are less tangible but equally real; usually expressed by status or other forms of ranking, they show
both the relativity of and the conflicts within the class
structure. Political relationships, or the wielding of
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power, are crucial for the dynamics of the class system,
since the overall equilibrium of specific class relations
is maintained or altered by political means. Put another
way, politics translates the very general development of
productive forces into a distinctive set of class relationships .
Hence a class structure is caused by and causes relationships. Any historical class is composed of a cluster of relationships, which in turn form a distinctive
pattern of relationships for those people within it.
Primary class relations are material, but specific class
relations, those affecting real people, have social and
political origins. As a result, why individual people
get into a particular class and how they behave once they
are there is due to the cultural-historical experiences
of the individuals and their ancestors.
The set of relationships which constitutes a particular class also produces the characteristic life situation and interests of that class.
Class-consciousness
arises when through common experiences and actions people
within a class perceive and express both their unity and
also their consequent opposition to other people having
different patterns of relationships. Since, however, experiences—the effects of specific patterns of relationships--vary, so class-consciousness is dissimilar in its
manifestations and in its emergence. Moreover, within
every class there are groups and strata arising from subsidiary configurations of relationships, subject to their
own specific experiences, and conscious of their particular interests and unity. Thus a limiting factor to the
growth of class-consciousness lies in the extent to which
various other relationships reinforce common production
relations, for this overlapping decides whether common
experiences will be interpreted in terms of class situation (and thus stimulate class-consciousness) or in terms
of smaller-group interests and actions.
The predominance of class-consciousness over strata
or other group consciousness is therefore neither usual
nor automatic. For it to occur, members of a class must
perceive that their identity of interests arises rather
from the production relations which define their general
class situation than from the particular relationships
which put them into a specific situation. In other words,
their experiences must lead them to look beyond particular
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relationships (family, gild, town) to see what unites them
with other people whose specific life experiences may differ but who stand in the same general relation to the economic structure. Why should this change of focus or concern take place? Basically, I believe, for either of two
reasons, depending on the nature of the group. First, in
the case of cross-class groups (say, gilds) because important experiences would no longer affect all members of the
group in like ways, but would affect members of the class
similarly; or second, in the case of mono-class small
groups (say, journeymen) because such experiences uniformly touched not only the one small group but also
other small groups with analogous production relations.
Of course, such changes in experience and how it is perceived might well happen simultaneously for both kinds of
groups, thereby opening the way for yet stronger classconsciousness .
Keeping these general definitions in mind, I would
like to look at the social formations to be found in early
modern European cities.
* * *

By the late Middle Ages, the societies of the larger and more advanced cities of Western Europe were characterized by three broad classes. The structural
similarities of handicraft or petty commodity production
had engendered similar divisions of labor in widely divergent areas. At the top was a composite elite consisting of merchants, professionals, rentiers and a small
number of entrepreneurs, the precise anatomy contingent
upon the history and present economic vocation of the city
in question. Members of the elite had wealth, power and
status which differed in degree from thatpossessed by
everyone else in society. For the most part, they also
had a significantly different relation to production.
Individuals at the top did not derive their position or
their livelihood from the personal performance of physical labor. Nor did they usually own the means of production: even entrepreneurs acted as coordinators of the
work of dispersed employees rather than as proprietors of
fixed productive property. Instead, no matter what their
specific occupation, members of the dominant class acquired their economic importance from the possession of
various components of liquid capital which was largely
invested in the pritbrce, banking

or government bonds. Analysis of elite assets reveals a
concentration of property and wealth, while other studies
demonstrate that the elite formed the effective political
class dominating municipal government.
This is not to say that the top of urban society
was always united. The particular economic roles of the
disparate strata within the elite gave rise to conflict,
while political factions often formed around new men who
were unable to break into existing oligarchies, such divisions commonly being reinforced during the 16th century
by religious differences. Of all classes, however, the
elites had both the widest nonlocal contacts and also the
firmest sense of their distinctive needs. This was particularly true of the merchants, who in fact formed the
vanguard of the elite. The economic activities of merchants, which involved them in emerging national and international markets, promoted the common experiences
(threats as well as opportunities) and relationships
necessary for the birth of class-consciousness. Thus
from an early date one finds examples of interurban commercial organizations, call«<i Hansas, leagues formed to
protect and foster common mercantile interests. Urban
elites usually had a clear idea of the political and
economic structures which gave rise to their condition
and a willingness to maintain them. Thus, for example,
the merchants who controlled the government in the textile and commercial city of Lille during the 16th century
upheld the autonomy of weaving masters, in order both to
avoid dangerous social polarization and to preclude the
rise of a capitalist class which could jeopardize the
current distribution of power. A more dramatic expression of class-consciousness on the part of an elite was
the controlled revolution carried out by the mercantile
oligarchies of the northern Low Countries.
It must be emphasized, however, that the urban
elite was by no means always to united or so conscious
of its common interests as in the foregoing instances.
Just as usual was discord, especially in crisis situations. To take a Mediterranean example, the troubled
history of Genoa during the later 15th century was due to
attempts by competing factions of wealthy merchants to
capture control of local government. In this case, socia
relationships proved more compelling than economic ones.
Below the elite was a middle of small craftsmen and

petty shopkeepers. Like the elite, the urban middle
possessed enough capital assets to be independent and in
fact shared legally-defined citizenship which symbolized
the political and economic independence of its recipients
by bestowing de_ jure equality upon them. But the unity
created by citizenship concealed a multitude of more important class disparities within the juridical estate of
burghers. First, the urban middle differed in both the
amount and the form of its capital possessions. For
whereas the elite had relatively liquid capital, used for
commerce and investment, the artisans and shopkeepers of
the middle had their capital in the form of fixed productive assets, and had few if any other capital resources.
Indeed, I take it to be one of the distinctive features
of early modern precapitalist urban society and economy
that the mass of the means of production was in different
hands from the mass of liquid capital and, as a result,
that the productive and distributive aparatuses were also
under separate control. That is, the crucial distinction
between the elite and the middle originated in the structure of the preindustrial economy. In the precapitalist
craft system, ownership of highly profitable commerce and
banking on the one hand, and of less lucrative but equally indispensable production and local sales on the other
hand, did not reside in members of the same class. On
the contrary, these two economic functions remained separate, with the urban middle owning the means of production and the elite monopolizing commerce and finance.
Even if he employed an apprentice, journeyman or other
assistant, the petty master obtained the essential part
of his livelihood by personally applying his own physical
labor to his own capital, as well as supplying what minimal amount of management was requisite. And precisely
because they had to engage in daily labor to support
themselves, due to their small individual units resulting
in limited output and meager capital formation, craftsmen
and traders were unable to get involved in profitable
long-distance commerce. Regardless of final disposition,
their commodities had to be sold immediately in order to
replenish working capital. Thus the urban middle had its
origins in, was defined by, and owed its continued existence to the divided possession of productive and of majo
commercial and financial facilities.
A function of gilds was to ensure that masters

retained control of the means of production and thereby
of the capital assets which would give at least a modest
independence. To carry out this task, gilds enforced
quality controls which gained acceptance for artisanal
products on the market, sought local monopolies against
nearby competitors, and fried to restrain overproduction
which would lower prices and ruin marginal masters. In
addition, corporate organizations institutionalized and
defended a job hierarchy, central to which was the independent master.
Since it was the dual separation of productive and
liquid capital which gave birth to and maintained the
existence of the urban middle, any change in this condit i o n — a n y merger of the separate economic a c t i v i t i e s —
could only mean trouble for the middle. Pressures resulting from the vicissitudes of business affected ail
craftsmen, although specific economic conditions had disparate effects on different trades and individuals. Yet
some professions were also endangered in ways which were
structural and inherent rattier than circumstantial or accidental to ^.he nature of the handicraft mode of production. Two strata of petty producers can be discerned,
the first of wich embraced those working for and selling
in the local market. Their limited numbers and outputassured them of steady demand and quick sale of necessarytraditional goods. Since they made the entire finished
commodity in ways requiring no division of labor, an investor could hope for little additional gain by reorganizing and rationalizing their work. Furthermore, the
usual source of high profit—exploitation of the physical
and temporal separation between producer and c o n s u m e r id not obtain. As they did not labor for the export
market, such artisans and traders encountered no quantitative stimulus for qualitative change in productive
forces for greater efficiencies and higher profitability.
Nor did they have in their midst significant numbers of
artisans with large amounts of capital, who were eager
to reinvest in the same line? of business. What few there
were found it much more lucrative to enter long-distance
commerce.
In short, not only would an entrepreneur find
it difficult to get a foothold among these small artisans
and traders, but it would not prove a particularly advantageous proposition even if he did.
It is not surprising,
therefore, that the marginal masters in such crafts ex-
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cited more interest on the part of the userer than on the
part of the would-be capitalist.
Much more vulnerable were artisans producing for
export, meaning, in our period, especially the various
crafts involved in textiles. The widening of the market
meant that capital was rapidly accumulating in the hands
of merchants and prospective entrepreneurs. And whereas
the petty producers required working capital to carry on
as independent businessmen, the possessors of liquid
wealth could use it to take away artisanal autonomy.
Furthermore, because fabrics were made by a number of
specialized operations, each the preserve of different
craftsmen, an organizer who could both gain control of
raw materials and means of production and also coordinate
the productive processes could realize important economies which would allow his to lower prices and capture
more business. Thus the urban middle, united through its
relations to the means of production, was potentially
riven by the threats facing it.
The dangers to textilemakers' independence underline the fact that the possible protections which these
artisans could seek were not economic—there, everything
favored potential capitalists—but had to be political.
Obviously, gilds sought help from town governments to reinforce their protective regulations. By means of laws
and sanctions, enforced by local governments when necessary, gilds hoped to prevent nonmasters from procuring
control of either the processes or the means of production. With such aid, gildsmen could continue directly
to realize the product of their own labor. As a result
of such aid, however, the economic independence of
weavers--their persistence as members of the middle-implied an increasing dependence on the political structure—on the elites—which ultimately upheld the corporate framework. As I have indicated, such assistance
might or might not be forthcoming. When it was, as in
Lille, the middle stood firmly by the local elite.
Failure to provide necessary assistance could, however,
lead to considerable difficulties for city governments,
as happened extensively during the Netherlands Revolution.
Socially and economically, the urban middle was
conservative, as it had to be, since its existence relied
on the preservation or restoration of the traditional
economic structure of small craft production. But to

attain this goal, to assure its continued independence,
this class acted as a political swing group, behaving in
a revolutionary or conservative way according to the requirements of the local situation. Showing an awareness
of their fundamental social and economic interests, and
of the threats to them, craftsmen and traders were willing to assure them in any expedient manner. If that defense involved political conformity, it was forthcoming;
if revolt seemed more appropriate, then gildsmen resorted
to it. Potentially a valuable ally against external and
internal opponents to the municipal regime, the urban middle could just as well disrupt the stability of the
status quo if given sufficient cause. During the early
modern era, therefore, there was a struggle fought out in
the political arena over how and by whom craft production
was to be organized. The continuation of existing class
relations was at stake and both the elite and especially
the middle showed they were conscious of this fact.
At the bottom of society was a heterogeneous group,
partly composed of proletarians and much more of the poor,
those who had in one way or another been expropriated but
without thereupon being reintegrated into the economic
structure. Within this group were day laborers, unskilled
employees, domestics, ruined artisans, and those apprentices and journeymen who for a multitude of reasons would
never achieve mastership. Not possessing the means of
production, people on the bottom were vulnerable to even
the most short-term economic crisis. Economically exploited, they were also politically repressed, for they
rarely enjoyed citizenship or gild membership. Needless
to say, they lacked representation on government bodies or
any form of privilege giving them a real or permanent
stake in local society. At best, a fortunate few might
accumulate sufficient skill and capital to overcome their
condition of economic dependency and rise into the ranks
of the masters, but for the vast majority insecurity remained the permanent distinguishing feature of their
lives.
To overcome this problem, segments of the unprotected bottom strove whenever possible to obtain the protection enjoyed by its superiors, especially in the form of
corporate organizations, thus demonstrating perception of
their interests. In Italy, the "popolo minuto" tried unsuccessfully to get its own gilds, while in the Rhineland
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journeymen illegally established associations open only
to fellowjourneymen. But in our period popular movements
could at best hope for momentary success and then only if
urban militias, dominated by the middle, stood aside or
even joined with the bottom due to artisanal grievances.
Such alliances always proved temporary because of the
fundamentally clashing interests of employer and employee,
of privileged and unprivileged.
Imposed organizations
like welfare, embodiments of the consciousness of the dominating class about the bottom, usually were all that the
subordinate class was allowed.
Its own arrangements, expressing its own sentiments, were forced underground if
not destroyed.
So far I have stressed what created, made cohesive
and gave at least some consciousness to the three classes
described. Let us now look at the other side of the picture: the divisive aspects of early modern classes. Such
features are of two kinds: first, those working across
class lines; second, those isolating members of the same
class in one city from their colleagues elsewhere.
A glance at the structure of craft production will
show that common relationships to the means of production
were not often reinforced by other relationships. Production was carried out in small workshops staffed by a
master, a few journeymen and/or apprentices, and often
members of his family. Segregation between labor force
and household was not, in practice, strong: in many cases
apprentices and journeymen lived and ate with the family
and even were obligated to perform tasks around the house.
Moreover, the ideal career expectation for subordinates
was to rise through the hierarchy until they in turn became independent masters and full-fledged members of the
gild in their own right. Hence possibilities for sustained structural opposition between masters and helpers
were lessened, as was the development of consciousness
based on such distinctions. The organization of production itself undercut a sense of class identity, for gilds
heightened rivalries between people performing similar
economic functions but producing different goods and services. The damaging results of intergild rivalries appeared glaringly in Ghent during the Netherlands Revolution. After gildsmen had overthrown the urban oligarchy,
restricted and corporate interests prevailed.
Agreement
concerning general goals of restoring corporate sharing
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in government disappeared when it came time to implement
them in specific ways. Prosperous boatmen, butchers,
fishmongers and haberdashers wanted mostly to regain
their customary place in municipal government and the
prestige that went with it. Hurt only by short-term
economic fluctuations and not threatened with permanent
loss of independence, they wished to use the propitious
circumstances of the Revolt merely to restore the ancien
regime and then come to a moderate understanding with
Philip II. Weavers, whose heavy cloth industry was in
deep trouble, sought greater political changes and guarantees for their craft, rejecting all accommodation with
the royal government. The different problems faced by
the various trades provoked different, finally incompatible solutions, and these prevailed over initial unity.
As a result, the moderate and affluent crafts remained
Catholic and eventually went into open opposition to the
radical and increasingly Protestant town government, and
this lack of artisanal unity contributed significantly
to the surrender of Ghent to the Prince of Parma, Spanish
military commander in the Netherlands.
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idarity during a crisis. Another town's misfortune could
easily be your city's gain. Localism made unlikely the
development of class-consciousness over a wide area, even
were it strong in any specific urban center. Economic
localism, strengthened by political decentralization,
rendered crucial events and struggles for power, prestige and wealth particularistic.
A striking instance of the effects of localism
occurred in Douai during the Netherlands Revolution,
where discontented craftsmen in locally-oriented business
made no effort in 1566 to link up with iconoclastic weavers in the vicinity.
In 1578, when they overthrew the
local government, members of Douai's middle proved unwilling to cooperate with the Estates-General, viewing it
rather as another outside danger to their town.
Indeed,
urban elites showed both the most class-conscious and the
best ability to overcome localism. They united to defeat
the insurgent middle by either a controlled revolution as
in the North Netherlands, or reconciliation with Spain,
as in the South.
The analysis given above emphasizes that class formation in Western European cities in the early modern
period was both localistic and still rather hazy even
there. Structural similarities over wide areas which we
can see were for contemporaries usually overridden, at
least in behavior, by particular concerns and by crossclass relationships. Class-consciousness was therefore
sporadic even locally and extremely rare concerning more
general relationships. Changes did, however, occur and
it is with a glance at them that I will conclude.
First of all, in towns practicing both textile production and long-distance commerce, the independent masters of the cloth trades found themselves under pressure,
which even an alliance with the local elite could not always withstand. Not surprisingly, therefore, the emergence of proletarian and capitalist classes occurred
first in the textile cities of Flanders and Italy, although it must be noted that this development did not
herald the general revolutionizing of the class structure,
as is clear from the crisis which overcame much of Western
Europe in the 17th century. Moreover, the conflict resulting from the alteration of class relations seldom
overspilled local boundaries. Usually, as we have observed, demands voiced called for a return to the traditional, protected, local structures of earlier times.

Even where resisted, such transformations were accompanied by others having more permanent effects: the
formation of national states and, albeit slowly, of
national and even international economies. In national
states, localistic classes had less leverage. The growth,
for example, of a stronger central state in the Spanish
Netherlands and the introduction of a national army took
power from local militias and sharply reduced remaining
artisanal political influence. Furthermore, the rise of
the state weakened the autonomy and significance of local
government where artisans had most influence and prompted
local elites to look outside their own communities for the
sources of their authority. To be sure, much of the old
elite resisted transformation into a capitalist bourgeoisie for reasons of political power, social status and
economic advantage. But larger economies made it increasingly difficult to maintain the old class structure. Merchants and wealthy masters accumulated capital more rapidly and could more readily bypass urban restrictions and
organize putting-out or even more capitalistic arrangements in trades such as mining, glassmaking and printing,
as well as in cloth.
Under such pressures, the gilds were unable to serve
as instruments for the maintenance of harmony, but broke
up alona more stratified lines: on nnp side, a minority
of masters who restricted access to their group in order
to protect their wealth and status; on the other, a mass
of journeymen and apprentices for whom the possibility of
reaching mastership was fast receding. Declining social
mobility therefore increased common experiences and class
cohesiveness. Employment in an expanding trade—such as
light clothmaking in the 16th century--might on occasion
permit substantial upward mobility, but generally such
expansion of output resulted in subjugation in one form
or another. In addition, the development of oligarchies
within the gilds went along with oligarchic government in
the towns. Artisans might revolt against these changes,
but aided by the central governments, the elites were
soon able to reverse restored gild rule. Since gild
leaders were now made responsible to the local rulers,
not to the craftsmen, the political structure gained access to and a large measure of control over the economic
organism of the middle. While the gild had traditionally
championed the interests of its members, by the sixteenth
century it had increasingly become a channel for imposing
governmental policy and implementing elite control. The
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tensive areas than before. Yet it is equally clear that
these experiences were still largely perceived across local and particularistic relationships whose resilience
demonstrates the incompleteness of economic and political
integration.
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Almost every urban history contains information, but few
try to make any coherent explanation of class or other
social relations and almost none do so from a Marxist or
marxisant perspective.

COMMENT

This paper focuses on the widespread failure of
social and economic transformation in early modern Europe
and therefore pays most attention to the 16th century and
to typical cities in which the old elite and precapitalist
middle managed to maintain themselves, even at the cost of
economic stagnation. A longer time perspective and mention of atypical cities might well have led to even more
stress being given to the breakdown of the city as an
autonomous economic and political system and the collapse
of the old ideology of community in the face of rising
capitalist classes. Hence a typology of early modern urban class structures would be useful, recognizing that
while in many cities the emergence of classes was slow
and retarded by other forms of consciousness engendered
by economic localism, in a few places capitalist social
relations between an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and an
expropriated proletariat were in the process of formation.
J.W. Smit

